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THE SIN OF PERFECTIONISM

ADDRESS
of

JEROME N. FRANK
Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission

before the

ANNUAL MEETING OF AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS

Hotel Peabody, Memphis, Tennessee

2:00 P.M., C.S.T., October 18, 1940

These tragic days, when so large a part of the world is being de
stroyed, to talk of governmental regulation of corporate accounting may
to some of you, recall the poet’s line about "lecturing on navigation
while the ship is going down," or Anatole France’s comment that "we

should conceive a positive pity for our economists arguing with one an
other about the cost of the furniture in a burning house.”

Put

those of you who are in that mood

should also recall President

Roosevelt’s recent remarks when he signed the Investment Company Act and
the Investment Advisers Act.

’’These Acts,” he said, "give the Securities

and Exchange Commission power to regulate investment trusts and invest
ment counselors.

They mark another milestone in this Administration’s

vigorous program ... to protect the investor.

As the pressure of in

ternational affairs increases, we are ready for the emergency because of

our fight to put our domestic affairs on a true democratic basis.
cleaning house, putting our financial machinery in good order.

We are

This pro

gram is essential, not only because it results in necessary reforms, but

for the much more important reason that it will enable us to absorb the
♦

shock of any crisis.”
I

There could be no single more deadly blow to the protection afforded to in

vestors by the SEC than a successful attack on its accomplishments in
the field of corporate accounting.

Without the SEC supervision of ac

counts, regulation of the issuance of utility securities under the Public

Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 would be meaningless and the Securi
ties Act of 1933 would be a joke.
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It is for that reason that I want to discuss the assault, on the ac

countancy work of the SEC, launched by John M. Hancock, of Lehman Brothers
on April 26, 1940, in a speech entitled "Responsibility on the Part of

the Public Accountant and His Client." There he referred to what he

called "the Securities Acts and their administration," and, noting that

annual corporate reports to stockholders are not within the scrutiny of
the SEC under those Acts, said that "a better Job is being done in the

unregulated field, than in the field covered by regulation."

Admitting

the need and value of auditors' reports, he spoke of "the trend of de
velopment in this field over the last six years” which seemed to him "to

have placed a false emphasis upon the need and value" of such reports.
Mentioning the days when monkish "mental gymnasts" theorized as to how

many angels could stand on the point of a needle, he said, "In these days
the same kind of mind — possessing plenty of intelligence but lacking
in Judgment — seems to be busy in developing all sorts of precise prac
tices for improving accounting methods and results.”

"I think," he re

marked, "the current drift is towards an undue emphasis upon the accuracy
of accounting for corporate reports."

And he doubted whether "there is

any warrant for devoting working time to a consideration of many of the
finely spun arguments striving for absolute accuracy of annual reports."

The "attempt to get so precise ... is not worthwhile," he commented;
and asserted that "there is no sound usefulness in the extreme precision

and extended presentation now being demanded."

And he emphasized "the

impassibility of absolute factual accuracy in accountants’ reports."
Observe what Mr. Hancock has done:

He has pictured the SEC as con

sisting of intelligent but academic theorists and impossibilists —

— 3 monkish "mental gymnasts”

striving, foolishly, in a necessarily imper

fect world, for absolute, perfection.
I want to discuss that ridiculous picture and to demonstrate its
falsity for these reasons: First, it is being paraded about the country
by a small group of ultra-conservative investment bankers who are engaged

in an effort to have the Securities Act gutted by amending it in such a
way that the SEC would be powerless to prevent the sale of certain large

security issues — even if the registration statements were clearly false
and misleading.

Second, such a picture, if it were believed to be accur

ate, would discredit the important work which the SEC, in cooperation

with such organization as yours, has done in gradually raising the stan
dards of corporate accounting and in establishing some relatively uniform
procedures in order that investors, and the public generally, will be
better informed as to what corporate managements are doing with the assets

of investors entrusted to their care.

In sharply disagreeing on the subject of corporate accounting with
Mr, Hancock and with those investment bankers who accept his views, I am

distinctly not to be understood as expressing any personal animus towards

him or them on the part of the SEC or myself.

In a democracy, all men,

of course are entitled freely to criticize any aspect of government.
And such criticism should not provoke anger in those government officials

who are criticized.

Freedom to reply to the criticism, however, is the

privilege of those officials. And a reply, by one on the SEC, to ad
verse comments by an investment banker must not be interpreted as an ex

pression of hostility towards the critic in particular or investment
bankers as a group. The SEC has always recognized that the investment

- 4 bankers perform a vital function in our economy:

They supply one of the

means by which the savings of our citizens are converted into labor-pro
ducing plant expansion; without the investment bankers, America could not

have grown as it did, and could not continue to grow.

But a recognition

of those facts, and respect for Mr. Hancock in particular as an able in

vestment banker, do not require that I refrain from saying — without

any rancor — that I have little respect for the kind of attitude he has
expressed with respect to corporate accounting and its regulation by the

SEC.

That attitude can be illuminated by observing a similar attitude

in another field:
Time was, not so long ago, when a physician, engaged in making an
educated guess as to what was wrong with a patient and as to his future
health, relied chiefly on the appearance of the patient, his pulse, his

temperature, a glance at his tongue and throat, and on the physician's

trained Judgment, based on his background of previous experience.

To

day, most physicians also employ a multitude of laboratory tests.

Sup

pose now that a critic of modern medical practice came before you and

said:

"What's the use of all this expensive laboratory hocus-pocus?

It's sheer nonsense to expect absolute exactitude in medicine, and these

newfangled gadgets can't produce it.

well.

Nor will their use make everybody

A doctor must exercise Judgment; and Judgment based solely on

laboratory tests is no substitute for the good old ways.

were cured before there were any medical laboratories
*

Many patients
Let's scrap

them and go back to the old, simple, observational methods."
Such remarks are an instance of dangerous

ing.

They present a false antithesis.

uncompromising think

They divide the subject of

- 5 medical practice up into two distinct hemispheres:

first, one in which

doctors make their educated guesses as to a patient's present and future
health without modern laboratory aids and second, one in which those aids

and nothing else are employed.
alternatives.

It erroneously depicts two and only two

Of course, today no physician in his senses relies solely

on laboratory techniques.

He uses Judgment based upon both the old and

the new methods.

But the critic stupidly insists on either the old or the new.

And

he rejects the new because (1) it alone is Insufficient (as every doctor

knows) and (2) it does not bring perfection in doctors' educated guessing
(which no doctor or intelligent patient expects).

Such a critic dogmatically employs what may be called "either-or"
thinking, an approach which is wholly fallacious with respect to most

subjects — including accountancy
to one of two possible methods.

Since it unwisely confines attention

Usually, there is not such a limited

choice — as if between black or white.

There is a spectrum of choices;

or, rather there are choices between several possible blendings of methods,
old and new.

Frequently, the new does not displace the old but supplements

and improves it.
What we need is "both-and" thinking which says, "We want some of this

and

also some of that," which does not pit the "purely" good against the

"purely" evil, but makes nicer discriminations and differentiations.

will note that science employs graduated scales of value.

You

It does not

portray heat versus cold, but speaks rather of 20 degrees or 60 degrees

or 100 degrees of temperature.
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We should beware of the dogmatic "either-or" man.

He is, in most in

stances, a kind of perfectionist; and perfectionists are dangerous people
who often stultify progress and prevent desirable change.

The sin of per

fectionism is that it mutilates life by demanding the impossible.

Perhaps I should be a little more explicit.
two kinds of perfectionists.

There are, I suggest,

The positive perfectionist is a man who in

sists that men must live up to his ideals even if they are impossible of

attainment.

He demands the impossible in conduct.

anything short of absolute perfection.

He is impatient with

But, in his favor it should be

noted that he is usually aggressive - forward moving - in his search for
perfection.

There is, also, the negative perfectionist.

because it will not bring perfection.

He is against all change

Unless a proposed forward step

will produce the "absolutely” perfect, he opposes it.

He prefers whatever

exists, no matter how bad, unless it can be supplanted by a flawless sub

stitute.

He is a passive resister.

He usually tries to defeat a particu

lar change by mistakenly charging that its proponents claim perfection.

He erroneously reports them as saying, "This new device will have no de

fects."

He ignores their qualifying adverbs, puts in their mouths words

which they never uttered, and ascribes to them attitudes which they never

entertained.

He somehow induces himself to believe that they are 100%

percenters, all-or-nothing fanatics, wild-eyed advocates of the

impossible.
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The speech of Mr, Hancock is an excellent specimen of that kind of
absolutist or negative perfectionist approach in its most pronounced form.

You will recall how, in favorably contrasting (1) unregulated accounting
with (2) accounting when regulated by the SEC, he characterized the latter

as involving an impossible striving for "extreme precision" and for "ab
4

solute factual accuracy,”

You see, at once, the tactics of the negative perfectionist:

Mr.

Hancock has loaded the dice in favor of unregulated corporate accounting.

He describes, as the one and only alternative, a kind of regulation
which seeks to require the "extreme" and the "absolute."
tion were correct, there could be but one verdict;

under the Securities Act would be ridiculous.

If that descrip

regulated accounting

If the choices were, in

truth, restricted to the two presented by Mr. Hancock, no sane man would
fail to elect in favor of unregulated accounting — in favor either of.

the repeal of most of the Securities Act or the condemnation of those who

have administered it.
But that picture is absurd.

The Securities Act does

not contemplate anything so impossible as "absolute accuracy” or "ex

treme precision" in accounting.

Nor does the SEC seek to obtain it.

you are well aware, its aims are far more restrained.

As

It strives for

improvements in accounting standards, admitting freely that perfection

is unattainable.

That the SEC does not deal in "absolutes" or "extremes"

is well known to most of the accounting profession which, I am glad to

say, has cheerfully cooperated with us in striving to improve corporate

accounting — and without aiming to reach the moon of perfectionism.

- 8

Neither the SEC nor the accountants discard all the old techniques (necessarily
involving judgment), nor assume that all the new and. improved accounting

standardswhich
-are gradually being evolved — will ever exclude all
error and produce absolute precision and infallibility.

But you and the

SEC believe that accounting must be constantly reexamined, and that re

visions of procedures must be made again and again, in order that the
profession may serve the current needs of the investing public with all
practicable efficiency.

To my mind, bur cooperative program has not

over-emphasized the need and value of your reports as auditors; and I be

lieve the improvements which have been made have been salutary.
Mr. Hancock deplores "the kind of attacks which have been made
upon management and upon auditors during recent years."
fair attacks, I concur.

If he means un

If he means severe criticism of some managements and

auditors based upon such cases as McKesson & Robbins or some of the

cases recently reported in our investment trust studies, then he is
surely wrong.

I hope that, in that respect, I have misunderstood him.

But I do go along with him in objecting to those who have tried to put

business, as a whole, "in the dog house."

It is Just because I think

that indiscriminate efforts to over-populate the kennels with business
men should be avoided that I trust that, by the cooperation of honest

practical businessmen, accountants and government, we can make life so

hard for the crooks that honest businessmen may not unfairly be accused
because of the misdeeds of their dishonest fellows.

As the heart of Mr. Hancock's attack on SEC regulation of accounting
is to be found in his commendation of the unregulated annual corporate
reports to stockholders, it is of interest to note that the New York
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Herald Tribune — a most conservative newspaper — said, on August 22,
1940, of those unregulated reports:

"While a number of corporations have

realized the wisdom of publishing informative, detailed reports of their

operations, complete with comparisons and share earnings, there are still

too many companies which believe that the function of the report is to
obfuscate rather than to elucidate."
That statement is amply confirmed by the exhaustive studies conducted
by the SEC of malpractices by certain investment trusts.

In our report

to Congress on the accounting methods of those companies we. said, in part:
"With this large industry almost completely unregulated and unsuper
vised information concerning these abuses and some protection against

them might have been afforded the investing public had there been in gen

eral use a sound and recognized body of uniform accounting principles
and practices.

The Commission’s study of the accounting practices of in

vestment companies has disclosed, however, that during the period studied
there was almost completely lacking in the investment company industry
any such recognized body of uniform accounting principles and practices.

Instead, there reigned such diversity and confusion, that accountancy some

times was transformed into an instrumentality by which abuses were both
perpetrated and concealed rather than exposed.

It is clear that the man

agements of many investment companies, free from almost any restraint,
favored those accounting practices in connection with their companies
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which were not in accordance with sound accounting principles, but rather
according to whatever designs seemed to the managements best fitted to

promote their Immediate objectives, and the adaptability of one method or
another to the accomplishment of these ends.

So great was the variety of

accounting practices in use among the various companies that the terse
terminology of the stockholders' report became either unintelligible or
definitely Misleading.

The few short words which traditionally comprise

the vocabulary of income statement and balance sheet - "income,” "profit,”
"capital,” ’’surplus” — were invested with such varied and conflicting

significance that they afforded no true measure of the performance of the
individual company, and rendered almost impossible accurate comparisons

between companies.
"For example, at least four different methods were available to in

vestment companies in computing the cost of securities disposed of from

a block which had been acquired at different times and prices.

Fre

quently, the use of one or another of these methods would result in the
recording of a "profit” on the sale, while use of the others would have

produced a loss.

In consequence, it frequently occurred that a company

which reported substantial earnings fundamentally had a position no

better than another company which reported a loss, due to the use of

varying criteria of cost measurement.

Moreover, from one year to the

next, behind apparently identical earnings reported by a company might
lie very different results caused by a shift from one method of deter
mining cost to another.

In the same manner, and with like effect,
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securities carried in the portfolios of investment companies were valued
in accordance with four distinct standards, each of which affected in
vestment and profit accounts differently.
“Reports to stockholders were found to be deficient in numerous re
spects.

Some were deficient in their failure to reveal the basis of com

putation of profits or losses upon sales of securities ... In others
there was a deception arising from the failure to qualify the amounts of

profits and losses when portfolio securities had been disposed of after
a write-down. . . Likewise, trading losses were considerably Understated.

. . . By a failure in some Instances to publish adequate analysis, re
serve accounts became instrumentalities for covering up realized losses

and for the distortion of trading results.

Similarly inadequate analyses

of surplus accounts in published reports led to the concealment of sub

stantial realized losses. . . .
“Accountants’ certificates which accompanied statements sent to

stockholders were often characterized by equivocal phrases and material

omissions.

The statements themselves appear to have been more often in

scrutable than informative. . . The conclusion seems unavoidable that

large numbers of stockholders were led to repose confidence in reports
which would otherwise have aroused their suspicion, by the very presence

in these reports of the names and certificates of certified public

accountants.

Although this may have resulted in some measure from the

failure of the public to apprehend the limited nature of the accountants’

engagement or from the fact that those limits were not made known, the
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study discloses that, even within the scope of their contractual duties,
the work of many accountants was replete with faults, both of omission

and commission, which contributed materially to the end result.

It is

a commonplace, tp which the present study gives point and substance, that

protection which does not protect is more dangerous than none at all."
It is gratifying to note that Mr. Hancock’s eloquence did not per

suade his own business associates.

For Mr. Arthur Bunker of Lehman Cor

poration (affiliated with Mr. Hancock's banking house) in the summer of
this year — a few months after Mr. Hancock’s attack on the accounting
provisions of the Securities Act and their administration by the SEC —

Joined with other leaders of the investment trust industry and with the

SEC in recommending the Bill which, in August — without a single dis

senting vote in either house of Congress — became the Investment
Company Act of 1940.

That Act contains provisions which go beyond

the Securities Act of 1933 in conferring upon the SEC powers to regu
late the shockingly sub-standard accounting practices which had

occurred in parts of that industry.

The business spokesmen for that

industry recognized that the establishment, by SEC regulation under leg

islation, of decent accounting standards was essential to protect honest
managements from unfair competition by dishonest managements.

They did

not accept Mr. Hancock’s views that legislation of tnat kind "hampers or
prevents ... sound healthy business life."

And they did not agree with him that annual corporate reports
to stockholders, not subject to SEC scrutiny, show that in

- 13 corporate accountancy ”a better Job is being done in the unregulated field

than in the field covered by regulation” or that "the tendency for law or

regulation is to set up either unworkable standards or low standards . . ."
For the Investment Company Act specifically gives the SEC jurisdiction over

the annual reports of investment companies to their stockholders.

To Mr. E. P. Connely, President of the IBA, such governmental scrutiny
is "espionage."

That, of course, is mere name-calling.

ployed to damn any necessary governmental scrutiny;

It could be em

Shall we say, for in

stance, that government bank examiners, inspecting a bank, are engaged in
"espionage," and shall we, accordingly, abolish government bank examinations?
At any rate, many of the investment bankers, who sponsored the Investment

Company Act of 1940 and who are also leading members of Mr. Connely’s IBA,
plainly did not accept his philosophy.
Investment companies, however, comprise Only a small fragment of our

corporations.

The reports of most corporations to shareholders have for

the most part been subject neither to scrutiny by a governmental agency,
nor to specific statutory requirements.

Many, in the 1920’s and early

'30's, used the "dance card" report — a ten-item balance sheet, and pos

sibly a few kind words by the president.
statement was a rarity.

A reasonably detailed income

The critics of the time, many of whom were ac

countants, were by no means oblivious to these shortcomings.

nation by W. Z. Ripley
*
are of a long past area.

has become classic.

By no means.

The condem

You may say that such examples

True, there has been some improve

ment — and particularly so because, after the passage of the Securities Acts,

* Main Street and Wall Street (1926)
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many accountants have refused to certify annual statements unless in sub
stantial conformity to the annualreport forms/filed with the S.E.C.

But many

areas of Information are still omitted from the reports sent to stockhold
ers.

The far flung industrial empire of parent, subsidiaries, and inter

vening holding companies is still reflected, for the most part only in the

form of consolidated statements.

The balance sheet of the parent, the only

entity in which its stockholders have a direct interest, is seldom made

available, even when there are large minorities or heavy debts in the sub

sidiaries — all ranking ahead of the parent’s creditors.

When consolida

tion is not complete, separate statements, even for important unconsolidated

subsidiaries, are the exception.

Often nothing is said as to the relation

between the earnings and dividends of subsidiaries or as to the increase
or decrease in the parent’s equity.

Sometimes not even the extent of the

minority interest is separately shown.

In one case at least, the balance

sheet was for one group of companies — the income statement for another.
Can these be examples of information unnecessary for an investor?

I think

not.

A study we have made of reports sent to stockholders shows many cases
of deficiencies in vital information.

What profit is. it to the investor to

know that t,he lump sum of cost of goods sold (including, without a break

down, selling, general and administrative expenses) is so much or, indeed,
merely that the difference between these expenses and net sales, both un
disclosed, is such and such an amount?

Much better than nothing, perhaps,

- 15 but is it comparable in adequacy and informativeness with the reasonably

itemized statement of income and expenses, required in reports to the
S. E, C., and found more and more frequently in the annual reports of the

progressive companies?
In the course of our consideration of particular cases, accountants
on our staff have again and again told us that there was no single well-

settled practice in a given field.

Indeed, in some cases there has been

a wide divergence in the views of various members of the staff as to the
proper practice to be followed.

Adoption of one or the other would have

resulted in wide differences in the amount of reported income and assets.

The organization and operation on your part of a research department is
also evidence of diversity in practice,

Many of our footnotes are designed

to require a disclosure, in reports to the SEC, of the accounting policies

followed in a particular field.

Yet a comparison of the unregulated annual

reports sent to stockholders with the filings with the S. E. C. (10-K re

ports) clearly shows that most of these footnotes are omitted from the
former.

So long as wide divergence in practice exists, can such omissions

be Justified?

Or is it to be concluded that it is unimportant to an in

vestor how income is computed -- so long perhaps as the result of the

computation is shown?

Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Commission has
power with respect to proxies of corporations, the securities of which are

listed on a national exchange.

Pursuant to that provision, we require

the furnishing of certain information as a basis for the solicitation of
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proxies; and, if financial statements are called for, there is a tendency

In

to assimilate the annual stockholders’ report and the proxy statement.

that indirect way, we do have some effect on the annual reports of listed
corporations.

Under the Securities Act of 1933, however, we have, virtually

no direct or indirect power over such annual reports.

The obligation to

file statements with us has had, to be sure, the collateral effect of placing

the unregulated report to stockholders on the defensive, if it differs
substantially.

But that is not a very effective method.

The Investment

Company Act goes further, as I have pointed out, with respect to investment

companies.

There is a provision in the Trust Indenture Act which opens up an
almost new field for conveying information to security holders:

A corporate

borrower, subject to that Act, is required to file reports with our Com

mission comparable to those required of listed companies under the Exchange
Act.

Rut the Trust Indenture Act goes beyond that point.

It requires the

borrower to transmit to each security holder such summaries of those reports

as may be required by rules and regulations issued by the Commission.

The re

cipients of these reports are not stockholders --- but bondholders or debenture

holders.

This is a partial recognition of the principle to which the

Supreme Court last year adverted, in

v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, that

the officers of a corporation owe fiduciary obligations to "the corporation,
its stockholders and creditors.”

these problems:

consist?

We are confronted under that. Act with

Of what should these summaries, sent to bondholders,

Should they approach a prospectus in scope?

Or the brevity of
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the average stockholders' report?

Being designed for bondholders, as

distinguished from stockholders, what special features and what differences,

if any, from annual stockholders' reports should be introduced?

questions are not yet decided,

These

Before they are, we shall again, as we

have in the past, seek your counsel and explore your suggestions.

Put I

have no doubt that the result at which we will arrive will give the bond

holders much greater accounting detail than Mr. Hancock thinks they should
have.
In Mr. Hancock's paper he referred frequently to an alleged suggestion

that corporate accounting could and should eliminate the exercises of
judgment on the part of accountants, and enable investors to make unerring
judgments as to future corporate earnings and as to the future market value
of corporate securities.

sense."

He characterized such a proposal as "sheer non

Now no one connected with the SEC has ever made such a ridi

culous suggestion.
is "sheer nonsense."

I agree that such a notion, to use Mr. Hancock’s phrase,

If science cannot predict next week’s weather with

any degree of accuracy, how can any intelligent person believe it possible
to predict, with exactitude, future corporate earnings — which are a

function of innumerable unknowable variables?
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Since, however, in October 1939, I made a speech, "Accounting for

Investors," in which I discussed the possibility of improved accounting

as an aid to somewhat better educated guessing about future corporate earn
ings, and since, far as I know, no one else in the SEC has as exten
sively discussed the subject of the relation of accounting to earning

forecasts,

it is fairly obvious that Mr. Hancock was referring to that

speech of mine.

It is true that I there suggested that accounting for

investors— which I differentiated from accounting for other purposes —

should give considerably more emphasis to those aspects of the corpora

tion’s history bearing on its past earnings and their causes so as to
furnish somewhat more assistance to the investor than he can now obtain

in forming a Judgment as to the company’s future earnings.

But I went

on, at considerable length, in that speech to point out that by no possi
bility could any corporate accounts reflect the numerous factors — many
of them unknowable by anyone — which an investor would need to know if

it were ever to be possible for him to form anything like a precise Judg
ment as to a company’s future earning power or the market value of his
securities.

Time and again I stressed the impossibility of an accurate

prediction as to such matters.

That speech of mine was published in The Journal of Accountancy for
October 1939, and I shall therefore not repeat it here in detail.

Those

of you who have read it will recall that my main theme was that more con

sideration of the kind of information which is valuable to investors might

- 19 be given in the preparation of those accounting reports designed for the

use of investors.

I said that the investor must be made aware that not

only are the principles of accounting not fixed and certain, but that the

facts to which they are applied are often matters about which reasonable
men can differ since, frequently, those facts rest upon human — and there

fore fallible — Judgment; that the arithmetical form employed by account
ants is a convenience which often expresses something that is but, at

best, a conjecture about conjectures; that the Investor should not be de
ceived as to the Inherent uncertainties which lie back of the prim and

neat arithmetical facade of the accountant's report.

I pointed out that,

while the primary value to investors of the accountant’s report was to

aid them in conjecturing the future net earnings of the corporation, they

must recognize that no one can "determine” future earnings.

can do,” I remarked, "is to conjecture
*

"All that we

to surmise — to guess.

And that

is true not only because: 'net earning's' is a relatively vague term

-- in

volving, as it does, fallible Judgments, as to depreciation, bad debts and
other items — but, far more important because the past is no infallible

guide to the future — except to an Omniscient Being, who knows all the

events of the past and correctly interprets their meaning for the future.
No man either knows all past events or is able thus to interpret them; no
man can, therefore, with surety, predict, the future. . .

Factors which

are inherently impossible to weigh and measure and therefore to estimate
in advance may. . . upset a well-thought out business forecast. . .

In

an era where change, not permanence, is the norm, where the one certainty
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is that, there is no certainty, we capitalize earnings which have been
stable in the past as if they were sure to be stable forever more.

We

thus project the impermanent present into an imaginary permanent future
. . .The truth is that profits are subject to hundreds of incalculables
which neither accountants, nor anyone else, can foresee.

Future earning

power, and therefore 'value,' are, I repeat, a prediction, a guess.
that guess should be an educated guess.

But

When I say that, I do not mean,

of course, that, because complete certainty in accounting is lacking, there

is or must be complete uncertainty.
tween those polar extremes. . .
essence of mortality.

The accountant's performance lies be

We are but mortal, and contingency is the

Only in the grave do we escape it.

Almost all

thinking is based on mere probabilities, not on guarantees. . .

To ask

for complete and absolute exactitude, at all points in accounting, is ab
surd. ”

And I concluded that part of my remarks thus:

"The accountant. . .

supplies some of the materials for, some of the ingredients of, the inves
tor’s judgment.

The ingredients he supplies should, therefore, be as pure

as possible; but the investor's judgment (or that of his advisers) cannot
be compounded solely of those ingredients, nor can the accountant be asked

to do the work of the investment analyst.

It is, accordingly, essential to

emphasize the importance of good accounting, but a mistake to overempha
size it to the exclusion of many other factors.

I distinctly do not mean

that the accountant is to forecast future earnings.

I do not mean that

he should give greater recognition to the fact that the principal interest
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of the investor and his advisers is future prospects — earnings.

In

sum, I do not mean that the present financial statements should be re

placed by earnings forecasts. But I do mean that financial statements .

intended for investors should be designed with a view to their ultimate
use in appraising earnings prospects.

That should be the focus of the

accountant’s attention in preparing reports for investors.”

Now those remarks on the importance of the income account to inves
tors were not entirely unorthodox, excepting, perhaps, in their cautious

ness.

For your own American Institute of Accountants had said five years

earlier that "the real value of the assets of any large business is

dependent mainly on the earning capacity of the enterprise,"
said:

and also

"It is probably fairly well recognized by intelligent investors

today that earning capacity is the fact of crucial importance in the

valuation of an industrial enterprise, and that therefore the income ac
count is usually far more important than the balance sheet."
*

And on April 26, 1940 — the very same day and at the same meeting
at which Mr. Hancock delivered his paper — Mr. Bowlby, a partner of the

well-known accounting firm of Barrow, Wade, Guthrie. & Co., after refer
ring to and generally approving my October 1939 speech, said:

"It may

be accepted as the present philosophy of investment that earning power is
the major factor.

However, investment judgments are not formed on past

results, except as those results throw light upon what may happen in the

*

Audit of Corporate Accounts (1934) pp. 6, 10.
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future.

Hence, it is essential that financial statements disclose such

information, regarding past events under known economic conditions, as
will enable a prospective investor, to form intelligent conclusions with

respect to future trends.

Probably no great portion of the investing

public can make an intelligent forecast, but those who can are entitled

to the information.

Hence, a principal objective of financial state

ments is to disclose the reasonably prospective net earning power of the

enterprise."

I suggest that you contrast those remarks with Mr. Hancock's

assertion that "it seems futile to think of an annual report as giving .

any adequate basis for appraising the future value of securities.”

The uninformed reader of Mr. Hancock's paper would conclude that we
on the SEC believe that the Investor should rely, to quote him again,
"upon details of accounting almost to the utter neglect of other fac
tors." Of course, that is not true.

No one believes more emphatically

than I — and I have said so, in public and private, many times

that

when one invests in a corporation he is inescapably investing in manage
ment;

that management involves the exercise of judgment and discretion;

and that the qualities of good or bad management include many Intangibles

which cannot possibly be recorded in figures.
Mr. Hancock, subsequently, made much the same point.

But because of

the impossibility of catching, in the net of efficient accountancy, all

the

facts

bearing on the future of a corporate enterprise, he concludes

that it is silly to use

accountancy

as one of the aids in surmising
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a corporation’s future.

He is guilty of a well-known fallacy — the con

fusion (to use high-brow terminology) of a "necessary” with a "suffi

cient” condition:

Thus, while it is true that men cannot live without

salt, that is not the equivalent of saying that men can live by salt alone.

Similarly, while good accounting is indispensable, it is not, alone, suf

ficient.

And so, that accounting can never be precise, that it unavoidably

involves Judgment factors, that it alone cannot be a guide to predicting
future earning power and that, indeed, there is no unfailing method of

predicting future earnings or future market values — all that does not at
all compel the conclusion that accounting for investors cannot be so revised

as to give to the investor some more help than accounting has heretofore
given in affording him part of the data upon which he can base a guess as
to future earnings and market values.

♦

Of course, there are no infallible means for arriving at precise

Judgments as to such matters.

Put we must do the best we can with the

best knowledge we can obtain.

"Every year, if not every day, we have to

wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge,"
said Mr. Justice Holmes.

Surely, if the past history of a company’s

earnings are told with approximate accuracy and the telling shows that

the earnings have heretofore been very bad, that narrative is some help
in forecasting the future earnings.

And the same is true as to a nar

rative showing a very handsome earning history.
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The point is that it is unsound to reason in any field that, because
perfection is not possible, and because increased information will not
furnish a foundation for completely guaranteed Judgments, therefore attempts
to procure as much more adequate and useful information as is available —

within the limits permitted by the nature of the subject matter -- is
useless or nonsensical.
Aristotle:

It is well to bear in mind these wise words of

"We must not look for the same degree of accuracy in all sub

jects: we must be content in each class of subjects with accuracy of such

a kind as the subject matter allows, and to such extent as is proper to
the inquiry. . .

An educated person will expect accuracy in each subject

only so far as the nature of the subject allows.”

The history of thought in every field contains instance after instance
of Just such objections to procuring more accurate information as have been

voiced by Mr. Hancock.

He referred
to
*

the Middle Ages.

But, in the Middle

Ages, men were burned at the stake for wanting to learn more about arithmetic,
astronomy, and dozens of other subjects.
Galen’s writings on human anatomy were derived from studies of the

insides of monkeys.

When Vesalius subsequently began dissection of the human

body in order to discover what it was like and how it differed from a

monkey’s interior, he was charged with impiously trying to upset the established
rules of anatomy.

As Andrew D. White tells the story, the cry that went up

against Vesalius "has been the same in all ages — the cry for what is called
"sound learning". . .

'safe.’"

The idea has always been that the older studies are

Certain men, one might say — thinking of Galen and Vesalius’s

critics — have a fondness for "monkey business.”
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As to vast areas of experience, the human race is ignorant and will
always remain largely so.

There are factors in the universe as to which,

because of our limited equipment, we shall always, almost surely, remain

in darkness.

Chance will always play an important part in human affairs.

Comparatively little of the future will, I think, ever be precisely pre
dictable.

But because our Ignorance is and must be large, that is no

reason why we should wallow in it, no reason why we should diminish
1

the unknowable, the unforeseeable,

our . efforts to reduce

so far as

possible.

It has been said that the better is the enemy of the best.

that is true.

Sometimes

But it is no less true that the all-or-nothing men, those

who will have nothing but the unattainably perfect, are the foes of Im

provement. If all men had insisted that either they must fly with the skill

of birds or not fly at all, aviation would be non-existent.

Negative perfectionism has often retarded the use of inventions.
Robert Fulton’s steamboat was called "Fulton’s Folly.”

DeForest’s ef

forts to launch the wireless telephone were laughed at by the Western
Electric Co. Not so very long ago the chief engineers of a leading tele
phone company scoffed, before the American Institute of Engineers, at

the automatic telephone.
Paradoxically, the calm acceptance of unavoidable imperfection im
proves effectiveness.

For such an admission rids us of an impossible task

and enables us to face the environment unburdened by a feeling of the
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By

necessity to stretch our aims beyond their practically possible scope.

conceding the immense amount of our inescapable ignorance, we become more
alert in detecting facts.

To the extent that one goes to sleep in a dream

of attainable perfection, he becomes the victim

of Uncertainties and

imperfections which he ignores and which he therefore fails to allow for.
The courageous attitude of accepting as inescapable the existence of

uncertainties and imperfections, makes one’s world picture more complex;

life is disclosed as far more precarious and difficult to conciliate.

But

such an attitude usually drives men to learn more about what was previously
undetected, thereby reducing the area of the unknown and uncontrollable.

It

is indeed a paradox that, insofar as we become mindful that life is
bound to be less perfect than we might like it to be, we tend to improve it.

We should never have had steam engines if men had been content with dream
engines.

Airplanes were not invented by believers in wishing rugs.

III
Please do not misunderstand me.

I am not for a moment charging

Mr. Hancock with deliberately and intentionally distorting the views of
the SEC.

He is an honest man.

was something like this!

But I surmise that what happened

to him

As I’ve indicated, he Joined a campaign to have

the Securities Act disembowelled.

Now if the SEC in its administration

were demanding perfection, if it were made up of academic extremists, then

Mr. Hancock would have had an excellent argument in favor of such an amend

ment.

He, therefore, doubtless wanted to show that such was the case.

Pre

sumably, when he came to write his April 1940 paper, he vaguely remembered
what I had said in October 1939.

If I had said what, in his paper, he ascribed

to me, it would prove his point.

And so this is what I surmise!

Wishful memory came to his assistance.

No doubt he honestly believed
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that I (or someone in the SEC) had made the absurd statements, which he

erroneously imputed to us.

He was, I suspect, so carried away by the

music of his own rhetoric that he neglected to check up on the accuracy

of his reporting.

Every lawyer knows that honest witnesses sometimes remember past events
in accordance with their desires.

The courts have observed that "men are

prone to see what they want to see;” that "our sympathies and our pre

judices bias our memories;” that "very honest persons often deceive them
selves without being aware of it;” that, when a person has a deep interest,

”his interest will, even if he wants to be truthful, impress upon his

memory with much greater distinctness those things which make in his
favor than it will those which make against him;” that ”our memories are
easy and oftentimes unconscious slaves to our will”; and that ”the inter

est of a perfectly creditable and innocent witness may, and often does,

color his recollection and mold his impressions, sometimes even insensibly
to himself.”

It is also a fact that Mr. Hancock was inciting to war on

the SEC and was perhaps influenced by the precept that men do not follow
an uncertain call to battle.

Let us look now at the central thesis of Mr. Hancock’s criticism of
the Securities Act:
are honest.

He points to the fact that most corporate managements

With that the SEC heartily agrees.

He goes on to say that

there have been some "notorious exceptions” but that the ’’good human

qualities” of "integrity, probity, ability and Judgment” of corporate
management cannot be ’’injected into a situation where they do not exist

through the operation of any Act of Congress or regulation based thereon.”
He says that he "has little belief in the power of law to make men honest.”

Again you will perceive a false picture made up of sharp blacks and
whites:

Of course, laws cannot make all men honest.

But that does not
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mean that one must go to the other extreme and say, "Therefore, let us

abolish all laws prescribing standards of honesty,"

is no substitute for good faith.

Of course, regulation

There are thieves and murderers in the

world despite the fact that for many years there have been laws against
theft and murder.

and murder?

Should we, therefore, repeal the laws against theft

Surely not.

Laws have their effects, partly because fear

of punishment for a violation of the laws acts as a deterrent and — far
more important — because, after a while, the existence of the standards
of minimum morality enacted into law creates habits and customs so strong

that most men will not break with those habits and customs, will not even
contemplate doing so, because they accept their operations as they do the
air they breathe.

As I said, Mr. Hancock is a "negative perfectionist":

If a law is

not sure to be 100% effective, then, he feels, the law is not good enough
and should not be enacted, or, if it is already enacted, should be repealed.

Mr. Hancock goes on to say that it is unthinkable to him that any

body of sensible men "will say as their deliberate judgment that the present
Securities Acts and their administration are in all respects reasonable."
Again I am in accord with him — as far as he goes.
the perfectionist phrase, "in all respects, "

For you will note

I defy anybody to find any

statute or any administration of any statute or any human institution
which is "in all respects" reasonable.

I do not believe that, at any

foreseeable time, there will be a world in which that will be possible.

Human institutions are, as their name indicates, human, and therefore

necessarily fallible.

The members of the SEC recognize that, because they are human, and
are called upon to act, they are bound to make some mistakes.

- 29 They would not want you to believe otherwise.
democracy.

For they are devoted to

And only under a dictatorship is it a dogma that those who

hold office can never err, *

The SEC Commissioners take only this to their credit:
conscientious best to avoid mistakes.

they admit it and change their ways.

They do their

When they find that they have erred,

In April 1940, Mr. Brownell, counsel

for Morgan Stanley & Co., in arguing before us, in the Dayton Power case,

that one of our own rules was invalid and that we should reverse ourselves,
said that he knew, from experience, that we could consider his argument

"with the same disinterestedness as the Supreme Court.”

Mr. Hancock reports that he is ’’impatient over the attempt to improve
everything at once." If he means instantaneous improvement, I share his

views.

But I deplore his intimation that a fanatical passion for im

practical instantaneous improvement of everything is characteristic of the

SEC.

If the SEC were so daft, why is it that the Investment Company Act

of 1940, at the express request of the business men in that industry, con
ferred upon the SEC far more discretionary power than the SEC requested?

That added discretion, in other words, was thrust upon us by those business

men.

Did not that fact — plus the fact that those businessmen vigorously

urged the enactment of that statute this year and did all they could to
avoid postponement of its enactment until next year — go to show that

they were willing to trust to the good horse sense of the present person

nel of the SEC?

*
,
,
* Without claiming to be "good”, we do share something of the attitude
expressed by the poet MacNeice:
"And to the good who know how wide the gulf, how deep
Between Ideal and Real, who being good have felt
The final temptation to withdraw sit down and weep,
We pray the power to take upon themselves the guilt.
Of human action, though still as ready to confess
The imperfection of what can and must be built,
The wish and power to act, forgive, and bless."
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And did not those facts, too, serve to answer the recent remarks of
Mr. E. F. Connely, that the federal government is endeavoring to over

regulate transactions in securities?

For it is a notable fact, as I have

said, that some of the principal members of his own Association were among

those who, a few weeks ago, successfully urged Congress to pass the Invest
ment Company Act.

Obviously they did not accept Mr. Connely’s thesis that

such regulation paralyzes free private enterprise and promotes totalitar
ianism.

They knew that the pre-regulation exploitation of thousands of

middle-class investors might constitute a prelude to totalitarianism; that,

if such exploitation continued, there would be grave danger of so angering
the great middle class that it would be likely to turn to some dictator

who, falsely promising to save the middle class, would destroy it, and,

with it, democracy and capitalism.

The truth is that the major function

of the SEC laws and the SEC is conservative — to aid the conservation of
our American profit system under our democratic form of government.
I repeat, we on the SEC are not perfectionists or panacea-mongers.

We are firm believers in sensible and intelligent working compromises.

I

wrote a whole book on that subject, published two years ago, in which I
said this:

promises.

All compromises are not evil or foolish.

Life is full of Com

Walking is a compromise between falling down and standing up. , .

Most dealings between human beings in daily life involve innumerable com
promises; civilization is built on mutual yieldings and concessions.

are good and bad compromises.

There

Some deserve applause and others condemnation.

And so with objections to "half way measures" and "gradualness."
Life
could not go on without them.

Sleep is a half-way measure.

brakes on a steep hill he is practicing gradualness.
or drunkenness is to be gradual and half-way.

When one uses

To avoid gluttony
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• But, although the SEC does not believe in perfection or in trying to
improve everything at once, it does believe in constant sensible efforts

at improvement.

I had always thought that was the American way of life.

I had always thought that the great progress which this country has made
over the years was largely a result of the fact that we have never been sat

isfied. We have constantly driven ahead to make things better and to make

better things.

That applies to manufacturers, doctors, scientists, law

yers, and to government as well.

to accountants and auditors.

There is no question but that it applies

We are not perfectionists, but we are "im

provists.”

While we on the SEC are devoted to gradualness and intelligent com
promises, we are definitely not appeasers.

We go along with those who be

lieve that there are some fundamental principles which must not be compro

mised.

The British people are valiantly demonstrating that attitude today.

They have cast off their former false leaders who believed it possible to
compromise concerning the minimal decencies of life with an absolutist
whose purported compromises are but deceptive means for achieving a vic-

tory by which he can work out his own absolutism that abolishes all free
choice for the average man.

Such absolutism is abhorrent to Americans.

We do not want dictators,

nor even an elected government, to manage all the affairs of life.

areas of industry need no governmental regulation.

Large

And, even where regu

lation is needed, it should not be all of the same pattern.

It should

vary according to the peculiar characteristics of the particular regulated

industry.

In some industries, it should take the form of governmental con

sultation and cooperation.

In others, some form of industrial self-regu

lation, with residual governmental supervision, is sufficient.

In others,

experience shows that varying degrees of more drastic regulation are nec

essary.
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Rigid and inflexible uniformity in the field of accounting would be
nonsensical. And Mr. Hancock, in attacking it, is knocking down a straw

man.

Perhaps I can explain the difference between his point of view and

that of the average investor:

He

He is an important investment banker.

personally knows many industrial leaders, and, without too much difficulty,

He can

he can obtain personal access to those he does not already know.

talk personally to them about their business and form a first-hand judg

ment of their abilities.

In so far as he can trust the information he

gets, he is able to place himself in a splendid position to know about
the future of business or the future of any particular enterprise.

In

short, he is in a most enviable position - a position not available to

most investors who want to find out about various enterprises.

He can

place an enormous amount of emphasis, in his analysis of a particular

situation, on management — because he knows management personally.

Put

the average investor who is not in that position, must place his reliance
on the record of management rather than on the personality of management.
And for the fair presentation of that record, the investor must rely to a

considerable extent on you accountants.

The investor may miss many factors

which Mr. Hancock can discover, but, if you give the investor or his in

vestment analyst enough details, he will find out at least whether or not
the record is a good record or a bad record and how it compares with other

records in the same industry.

That is especially true, if the investor

can feel confident that accounting practices and principles are relatively

standardized and that the accountant who has reviewed the data is com

pletely independent and reasonably curious.
To Mr. Hancock the unregulated annual report to stockholders is

apparently good enough.

But Mr. Hancock’s perspective can hardly be

said to be that of the average investor.

He is much more fortunate.
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He needs to have much less down on paper than the average stockholder.

But it is difficult to believe that important investment advisory
services, like Poors, Moody’s, or Standard Statistics would want to go
back to relying on the meagre accounting data contained in the average

In fact, I cannot imagine that even the ana-

report to stockholders.

lytical staff of the investment trust sponsored by Mr. Hancock’s own

firm would want to be obliged to rely solely on that information.

Of

course I would admit that the average stockholder must find detailed

balance sheets and income accounts — especially when there are a lot
of footnotes — pretty heavy going.

But I fail to find there even a

weak argument against the inclusion of such details.

After all, the

influence of the informed investor and the investment adviser, availing

himself of fuller information, is quickly felt in the market place.
*

Artificial market prices based on needlessly inadequate information — so

ruinous to the mass of investors in the past — are today made almost
impossible, as to registered securities, by the use of detailed and more
adequate information.

I am sure that you accountants will not at all

agree with Mr. Connely that "investors today actually receive in under
standable form less pertinent information than before the enactment of

the Securities Act of 1933."

And so,

to repeat,

I feel that we on the SEC and you in the

accounting profession can take pride in our constant efforts to improve
the standards of corporate reporting.

I feel confident, that we have

already made a contribution so substantial that, even if the Securities
* As to benefit to investors, through investment analysts, of the work
of the SEC, see Graham and Dodd Security Analysis (2d ed. 1940).
pp 49, 50, 53. 146, 229, 280, 286, 406, 420, 426, 446, 456, 598, 600,
609, 656.
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laws were to become a dead letter, corporate reporting would never again

shrink to its former status.

The stature of your profession has grown

immeasurably in the past few years.

envy of other professions.

Your increasing independence is the

Neither you nor we will ever attain perfec

tion, but I anticipate that we will spend a good many more years on our
joint effort to improve the quality and value of information to security
holders.

What we want for investors is the best available data practically
obtainable.

That they procure it may make life

duller for some persons.

As Abe Martin said, "Nobuddy kin talk half as interestin’ as the feller

that ain’t hampered by facts or infermashun.”

--- 0O0----

